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Abstract: Global concerns over the corruption of weak governments by firms engaged in transnational business
are the source of an international movement that emerged in 1997. Special concern is presently directed at the
weakness of enforcement of laws enacted in recent times to deter corrupt business practices in international trade that
were enacted in response to that movement. One cause of weakness in law enforcement is the failure of China to share
actively in those concerns and the efforts to address them. This essay will briefly record steps taken in other nations to
address the concerns and the limited effectiveness of those steps. It will urge Chinese participation in the international
movement and briefly suggest the need for private enforcement of the law if the movement is to succeed.
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1. The international movement
Concern for transnational corruption was expressed by the International Chamber of Commerce in 1977
when it first promulgated its Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery. 1 The Chamber perceived that
international business firms competing on the basis of the size of the bribes they offered to foreign officials with
whom they deal suffer diminished profits in their transactions with foreign firms and governments. They are
therefore less inclined to engage in transnational transactions and compete in global markets, with the result that
international markets function less efficiently, to the detriment of all nations.
The Chamber first expressed this concern in the form of proposed rules of business ethics, reflecting more
general concerns about business practices in international trade.2 But in the last decade of the 20th century, many
* A fuller presentation of the problem and the partial solution offered by private enforcement of international law is Paul D.
Carrington. Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law. Michigan Journal of International Law (forthcoming 201 1).The
proposals were briefly presented to three conferences. The first was at a Law and Contemporary Problems Conference at Duke
University in January 2007; that paper was published as Law and Transnational Corruption: The Need for Lincoln's Law Abroad, in
Law and Contemporary Problems, 70(4). 109 (2008). The case for private enforcement was presented again at a Conference on the
Civil Consequences of Corruption at Universitat Bremen. in March 2008. and republished as Law and Transnational Corruption: Is
There a Need for Lincoln's Law Abroad? in The Civil Consequences of Corruption. 37 (Olaf Meyer Ed., Berlin 2009). An improved
version was presented to the Law and Society Association Conference in Denver in May 2009.
Paul D. Carrington, Professor of Law, Duke University B.A., University of Texas. 1952: LL.B.. Harvard University. 1955.
Research fields: civil procedure and judicial administration. For additional information about the author, see paulcarrington.com.
1 The Rules were amended in 1996 and again in 2005. On their current content, see International Chamber of Commerce Department
of Policy and Business Practices. Major Changes Brought by the 2005 Revision of the ICC Rules of Conduct and Recommendations
to Combat Extortion and Bribery. Retrieved May 23. 2010. from www.netcasearbitration.net/uploadedfiles/ICC/policy/
anticorrpution/Statements./revised%/o20ICC%/o2ORules.pdf.
2 Such concerns were emerging in the early 1970s in the Group of Developing Countries (G-77) and in the United Nations. See S. J.
Rubin (1995). Transnational corporations and International Codes of Conduct. American Univ. J. Intl L, 10, 1275. S.K.B. Asante:
The concept of good corporate citizen in international business, in: A.A. Farourus (Ed.).(1994). Transnational corporations: The
international legal framework, 169. China was a member of the G-77, a group organized in 1964. See The Group of 77 at the United
Nations, http://www/g77.org/doc/.
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nations signed agreements obligating them to enact laws imposing criminal punishment on their citizens who
violate the Chamber's international standard of business ethics. The United States had enacted such a law in
1977 in response to Cold War concerns about the effectiveness of many governments in foreign states and their
vulnerability to diverse forms of subversion. 4 This federal Foreign Corrupt Practices Act's prohibition of bribery
of foreign officials was made applicable to foreign firms whose shares were listed on American exchanges and all
listed firms were required to disclose their forbidden misdeeds to prospective investors. Those violating were
subject to penalties imposed by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and to criminal prosecution by the
United States Department of Justice (DOJ). But for the next twenty years, the law was seldom actively enforced
by either the SEC or the DOJ because enforcement was seen to put American firms at a disadvantage in securing
international transactions if they were deterred from paying bribes to foreign public officials choosing firms with
which to trade. Both American investors and American workers would suffer if business was lost because bribes
were not paid. But that federal law did on rare occasion supply the standard of conduct on which a civil claim
could be advanced by a competitor disadvantaged by the misconduct.6
The economic crisis of the 1990s was centered in Southeast Asia and was seen to be in part a result of the
misdeeds of irresponsible governments caused by the corrupt practices of foreign firms.7 The World Bank then
came to share the concern of the Chamber of Commerce. In 1997, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) 9 responded to the concerns of the Chamber of Commerce and the World Bank by
promulgating a new international Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions. 10 This OECD Convention obligates signatory nations to enact criminal laws "functionally
equivalent" to those it prescribes, and to cooperate with the enforcement efforts of other signatory nations. To
reinforce that obligation, it subjects signatory nations to periodic peer review by teams of specialists from at least
two other states. " While laws enacted pursuant to the Convention prohibit transnational corruption, they do not
Ndumbe Anyu, J. (2007). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Catalyst for Global Corruption Reform. Frederick, MD:
PublishAmerica. See generally Stuart Deming (2005). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New International Norms. Chicago,
IL: American Bar Association, 93-100.
4 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §78-dd.1, first enacted in 1977, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
Donald R. Cruver (1999). Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (2d ed.). Chicago, IL: Section of Business Law.
American Bar Association, vii-viii. ("There have been numerous instances where the ability and willingness of non-U.S. firms to
bribe foreign public officials have placed U.S. firms at a tremendous competitive disadvantage.")
6 E.g., Kirkpatrick, W.S & Co. v. Environmental Techtronics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990): Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp.. 29 Cal.4th 1134, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29(2003).
7 Anyu, supra note 3. See also Deming, supra note 3.
Julio Faundez (2010). Rule of law or Washington consensus: The evolution of the World Bank's approach to legal and judicial
reform. In: Amanda Perry Kesaris (Ed.). Law in the Pursuit of Development. London: Routledge, 180. Professor Faundez expressed
skepticism based on the Bank's failure to address the lack of a political base for the reforms it advances. See also Linn Hammergren
With friends like these: Can multilateral development banks promote institutional development to strengthen the rule of law? Ibid.
202; Klaus Decker. World Bank rule of law assistance in Fragile States: The end of the beginning or the beginning of the end? Ibid.
224.
See www.oecd.org. Its thirty one members include members of the European Union, the United States, Canada. Australia, New
Zealand. Japan. Korea, Mexico. and Turkey.
0 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery ofForeign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, December 18, 1997,
S. Treaty Doc. 105-43. art. 1.1 (1998). For a brief account, see Lucinda A. Low & William M. McGlone (2003). Avoiding Problems
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. Antiboycott Laws. OFAC sanctions, export controls, and the Economic Espionage Act.
In: Mark R. Sandstrom & David N. Goldsweig (Eds.). Negotiating and Structuring International Commercial Transactions. Chicago,
IL: Section of International Law and Practice, American Bar Association, 200-203.
' Peer review is said to be "at the very heart of OECD". E.g., Fabrizio Pagani (2002). Peer review: A tool for co-operation and
change An analysis ofan OECD working method. Retrieved July 13, 2009, from http://www.oecd.org (search document title for pdf).
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require public disclosure of misdeeds nor do they forbid campaign contributions to foreign politicians, as the
American law does. 12 As of 2010, thirty-eight nations had ratified this OECD Convention including the
governments of most of the major players in international commerce. 1 China is the major exception. Hence
Chinese firms are relatively free to bribe foreign officials to secure profitable transactions that might otherwise go
to competing firms from OECD nations. This freedom seriously weakens the ability of OECD member states to
secure compliance with their laws enacted pursuant to the Convention.
Other international organizations have now joined the OECD cause to enlist scores of other nations. In 1997,
the Organization of American States promulgated the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption; 14 it is even
more explicit in requiring that its ratifiers enact specified criminal laws. In 2002, the Council of Europe's Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption entered into force, with forty-six signatories. 1 In 2003, the African Union opened
for signature its similar convention. 16 In 2006, the European Union adopted a resolution calling for the return of
assets of illicit origin to nations victimized by corrupt practices. 17
Also in 2003, the United Nations opened its Convention Against Corruption 8 negotiated by the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime in Vienna. It has been ratified by over one hundred nations and is also now in force. China
signed this Convention in 2003, and ratified it in 2006. 19 But the UN Convention falls short of making the
rigorous demand that the OECD and other conventions have made in signatory states. Its restrained tone is
reflected in Article 17:
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a
criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to
perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions. for the purpose of
obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity. (emphasis added)
The UN Convention also proposes that each State Party take action to proscribe deliberate concealment of
bribes 20 or obstruction of justice 21 , and provide for civil liability "if necessary" .
And despite these numerous international conventions and a few successful prosecutions, there is little
evidence that the frequency of corrupt practices in international commerce has significantly diminished. The
legislative enactments have been assessed as "hollow commitments". While no thorough empirical study
revealing an effect on the realities of weak governments has been conducted, the available data points to a
12 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1. See David C. Weiss (2009). The foreign corrupt practices act, SEC disgorgement of profits, and the evolving
international bribery regime. MICH. J. INTL L., 30(2), 471, 487.
" OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs. Retrieved May 18, 2010, from www.oecd.org/... /0,2340, en 2649 34859
2017813 1 1 1 1,00.html.
14 Deming, supra note 3, 101-104.
15 Ibid, 105.
16 African Union Convention on Combating Corruption, July II, 2006. Retrieved March 24, 2007, from http://www.africaunion.org/
Official documents/Treaties%/o20Conventions%/o20Protocols/Convention%/o20on%/20Combating%/o20Corruption.pdf.
1 A/C.2/61/L.53. The official explanation can be retrieved from http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/artcile 6571 en.htm.
1 U.N. Convention against Corruption, October 31, 2003. Retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime convention
corruption.html.




22 Article 26. It was said that this UN Convention was to be a "focal point" of the United States' campaign against corruption. Press
Release, Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Crime Control. Press Release (December 14, 2004). Retrieved
April 6, 2007, from http://www.state.gov/p/inlrls/other/39714.htm.
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conclusion by advocates of the reform movement that "enforcement must be re-energized" 23
2. The consequences of transnational corruption
The ineffectiveness of the measures deployed does not diminish the force of the arguments advanced by the
Chamber of Commerce, the World Bank, and the United Nations. Transnational bribery is strongly tempting to
those engaged in international trade but contrary to the larger interests of every state whose citizens or firms are
engaged in substantial transnational transactions.
There is, of course, nothing new about corruption as a local matter everywhere. Public officials in all states
are subject to temptations to abuse their offices for their personal benefit. And citizens or subjects of governments
are everywhere tempted to gain an advantage by improperly favoring an official having public responsibility for
business transactions or their consequences. Benjamin Franklin, the wise man of the American Revolution,
observed that "there is no kind of dishonesty into which otherwise good people more easily and frequently fall
than that of defrauding the government." 24 Except perhaps in smaller nations with homogenous populations,
government is to many or even most citizens a distant nobody to whom little loyalty is owed. A government
representing itself as accountable to the citizens it governs may tend to be less vulnerable to corruption. 2 But
even in democratic governments, the line of moral conduct for those in public service is not always clearly
drawn.26 Family interests, longstanding friendships, cultural or sub-cultural connections, and political alliances
supply corrupt motives in addition to simple self-interest. And if a foreign firm is offering bribes, it is not easy for
competitors to refrain from making a matching offer.
China may face a special cultural impediment to the drawing of clear lines of moral conduct in relation to
such public matters. That impediment is its ancient tradition of guanxi. 27 That moral principle had origins in the
teachings of Confucius that loyalty to one's family and friends is a higher calling than loyalty to one's Emperor or
his commands. It imposes a strong moral obligation to bond with those who have favored one's self or others to
whom one is connected. Its acceptance among Chinese citizens may have been elevated by the shared experience
of the Cultural Revolution of 1965 to 1974 when social chaos prevailed in many communities and thus enhanced
the felt need for connectedness. Hence, guanxi is reported to have a strong bearing on business practices in
28 29China. It is said to be a cause of corruption and bribery, practices not uncommon in China, as elsewhere. And
perhaps guanxi shapes the practices of Chinese firms engaged in international commerce who seek to bond with
23 Fritz Heimann & Gillian Dell (2008). Transparency international progress peport: Enforcement of the OECD convention on
combating bribery offoreign officials.
24 Historical review ofthe constitution and government ofpennsylvania (1759). Benjamin Franklin (1767). "F.B.": On smuggling,
The London Chronicle, November 21-24, (incomplete) retrieved July 13, 2009, from
http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp.
25 This may be seen as a defining problem in the Middle East. See Adham A. Hashish (2010). Fighting corruption: Civil government
under development law. Retrieved May 22, 2010. from papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1567806.
26 An American historian has even recently challenged the iconic legend of George Washington. John Fering (2009). The ascent of
George Washington: The hidden political genius of an American icon. New York: Ferling Bloomsbury Press. But not very
persuasively. See Gordon S. Wood (June 10. 2010). Was Washington "mad for glory?" New York Review. 65.
27 See generally Robert Buderi & Gregory T. Huang (2006). Guanxi, the art ofrelationships. New York: Simon & Schuster.
28 Eike A. Langenberg (2007). Guanxi and business strategy: Theory and implications for multinational companies in China.
Heidelberg, Germany: Physica-Verlag. Ying Lun So (2006). Explaining guanxi: The Chinese business network, New York:
Routledge. Yadong Luo (2000). Guanxi and Business. River Edge, N.J.: World Scientific. Ying Fan (2002). Questioning guanxi:
Definition, classification and implication. International Business Review, 11(5), 543-561.29 Langenberg. Ibid. 7.
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foreign firms.
I was informed of an extreme example of guanxi and its potential intersection with public or legal duties in a
visit to China in 1984. Citizens generally employed by the government as arbitrators of transnational commercial
disputes had been recently authorized to serve as attorneys to foreign clients. One such arbitrator was retained to
represent a Danish client in a dispute with a Chinese firm. As it happened, he had previously been assigned to
arbitrate that dispute. He simply rendered an award favorable to his Danish client without further ado, apparently
in the perception that the duty to his personal client overrode any mere public duty to remain disinterested in
hearing the Chinese adversary's defense and assessing the legal merits of the Danes' claim. An administrator of
the arbitration program was deeply troubled by this event and sought my advice about how the law in the United
States might deal with the issue presented. No doubt this extreme example reveals circumstances prevailing in the
years when the arbitration administrator's Republic was just emerging in the global economy after recovering
from its Maoist Cultural Revolution of 1966-1974.30 The Maoist regime had condemned guanxi as unpatriotic,
but that disapproval seems not to have prevailed among citizens outside the Maoist government. So the Cultural
Revolution had apparently not diminished the moral force of guanxi, but had perhaps diminished the moral force
of competing public law rights or duties.
Whatever the circumstances were in 1984, in the 21st century bribery of Chinese public officials is not
permitted. Citizens are thus required to maintain a distinction between bribery and guanxi. A striking example of
Chinese law enforcement was presented in May 2010 when a citizen identified as perhaps the wealthiest person in
China was fined 800 million yuan ($103 million) and sentenced to fourteen years in prison for business practices
that included paying bribes to five government officials.3
Even though the moral complexities of guanxi are not present in the United States, it has also long been
familiar with corruption. Officers of the government waging the 1 8 th century Revolution were detected betraying
the cause for their personal profit.32 The problem was again starkly visible during the Civil War of the 1860s,
resulting in enactment of a law rewarding citizens who asserted civil claims against those who were cheating their
government. That federal false claims law was much used during the Civil War. It would evolve over the
following century and a half to be a frequently used feature of American law that returns to the federal
government about a billion dollars a year from citizens or their firms who cheated it.34
But corrupt practices in China or in the United States are not the primary sources of concern on the part of
the Chamber of Commerce or OECD or the World Bank. The global problem is bribery across international
boundaries. Moral constraints on such payments are largely absent in all nations because of the disconnection
between the bribing firms and the people whose government they subvert. Adam Smith, the author of Wealth of
30 For a contemporaneous account of the resolution of the revolition, see Tang Tsou (1986). The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao
reforms: A historical perspective. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago. Roderick McFarquhar & Michael Schoenhals (2006). Mao's
last revolution. Cambridge. MA: Harvard University.
31 Business crimes in China: Guilty of something. The Economist (May 22, 2010). 69.
3 2
' See, for example. an account of the misdeeds of Samuel Chase James Haw, et al. (1980). Stormy patriot: The life of Samuel Chase.
Baltimore, MA: Maryland Historical Society, 105-108. And see generally Zephyr Teachout (2009). The anti-corruption principle.
Cornell Law Review. 94(2). 231.
' Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat 696-699, codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 33.39 (2000).
3 The latest revision is Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, May 20, 2009, 123 Stat. 1617. The law
has over that time deterred but not prevented fraud on the government. See. Bryan Terry (2007). Private attorneys general v. "War
profteers": Applying the False Claims Act to security contractors in Iraq. Seattle Law Review, 30(3), 809.
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Nations 35 and premier exponent of free markets, observed in his earlier work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 36
that he and his fellow citizens of Glasgow would be very sorry on learning that China had fallen into the sea, but
then they would retire to snore in peace, feeling no responsibility for the distant souls lost. So it is that Chinese
firms are unlikely to feel moral constraints when tempted to bribe an official in Glasgow.
Recognition of transnational corruption as a matter for American national concern dates from the Cold War.
Prior to 1977, American firms had long been accustomed to bribing officials of foreign governments to induce
them to invest public funds in American goods and services or to tolerate their assault on natural resources or
other misdeeds. It was then fair to assume that such payments were sometimes indispensable conditions of foreign
trade because business opportunities were often going to the highest bidder, i.e. the firm offering the best bribe,
and were thus a necessary cost of doing business. Among the scandals revealed in 1975 was the payment of a
million dollars by The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands to secure a sale of
military aircraft.3 The costs of such payments were partly borne by the federal government because they were
treated as legitimate costs of doing business for the purpose of assessing firms' income tax liabilities. 39
In many impoverished nations, a little corruption here and there is the "grease" that enables governments to
recruit the public officers they need. But such complexities in the roles of minor officials in weak governments
may be likened to guanxi in that they do not ease the problem of bribery of powerful public officers by the foreign
firms or persons with whom they deal. It is now widely recognized that transnational corruption is a major cause
of the enduring weakness of many national governments whose elite officials receive payments that will soon be
deposited abroad for their benefit.
Indeed, the problem of corruption may be especially grave in nations endowed with natural resources highly
valued by people in wealthier nations. 40 Firms extracting minerals are often careless about the natural
environmental consequences of their extractions,41 perhaps especially when mining or drilling in nations distant
from their own, but the concern of ruling elites about those consequences is in many nations likely to be quite
limited and reconciled by the personal rewards they receive as controllers of governments unable to deter either
the corruption or environmental recklessness practiced by foreign firms. The World Bank calculated that bribes
totaling a trillion dollars were paid in 2002.42 A large share of that amount was undoubtedly paid to officials of
weak governments by firms that extract and export natural resources for sale in the developed world. And much of
the foreign aid to such nations provided by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund also seems quite
likely to end up in some officials' secret bank accounts.
Unless and until means can be devised to deter bribery of officials in weak governments, globalization can be
3 Adam Smith (1776). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.
36 Published in 1761.
37 136 (Oxford ed. 1976).
38 Obituary: Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, BBC News, December 2, 2004. Retrieved July 13, 2009. from http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/europe/749465.stm. Also bribed by Lockheed were officers of the Japanese government. Gerald L. Curtis (1988). The
Japanese way ofpolitics. New York: Columbia University. 163.
9 Internal Revenue Code 26 U.S.C. § 162(c) (1) (2000).
40 See generally Leslie Holmes (2006). Rotten states: Corruption, post-Communism and neoliberalism. Durham. NC: Duke
University. Susan Rose Ackerman (Ed.).(2006). International handbook on the economics of corruption. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward
Elgar Publishing.
41 Earle A. Ripley et al. (1996). Environmental effects of mining. Delray Beach, FL: St. Lucie.
42 Susan Rose Ackerman (2004). Governance and corruption. In: Bjorn Lornberg (Ed.), Global crises, global solutions, 301.
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of scant benefit to "the bottom billion"43 , who are destined to be governed weakly if at all. They will remain poor
partners in international trade. Meanwhile, corrupt practices will be a common feature of international trade
between more prosperous nations as well.44 Of course, as the Chamber of Commerce observed, bribes paid are a
cost of doing business that benefits only the corrupt recipients, diminishes business profits, and impedes economic
development. It is chiefly on the latter account that the World Bank initiated its effort to address the problem.
Ungoverned states subverted by corruption will continue to export migrants and serve as havens for all sorts of
gangsters, pirates, and terrorists. On that account, citizens of more prosperous nations have a personal stake in the
movement.
3. Enforcement of criminal laws on transnational corruption
Public enforcement of the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has been more vigorous in the 2Ist century.
The role of the SEC was enlarged by the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995.45 That law protects whistle-
blowers who reveal corrupt acts to enforcement officials, expands the criminal sanctions, limits the confidentiality
of communications to attorneys, and imposed a duty on auditors to detect and disclose corrupt practices. 46The
auditor is no longer permitted to rely on personal confidence in the integrity of the audited firm, but must
investigate the integrity of the firm's reporting of payments made.47 In addition, the SEC has commenced the
practice of requiring firms listed on American exchanges to disgorge profits proven to be derived from corrupt
deals.48
The United States DOJ has also substantially enlarged its staff of prosecutors responsible for enforcement of
corrupt practices law, 49 but their efforts seem to have more than reimbursed the national treasury for the cost of
their services. It is reported that American businesses creating joint ventures with Chinese companies or acquiring
Chinese outfits are especially exposed to the risk of prosecution because of the probability that their ventures are
corrupt. 50
And now the DOJ has begun to prosecute individual officers of firms who participate in the transnational
briberies and, along with the SEC, to require their employers to disgorge profits from deals acquired by their
crimes. Among those successfully prosecuted is a member of Congress who was convicted of bribing Nigerian
4' The phrase belongs to Paul Collier (2007). The bottom billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it.
New York: Oxford University Press.
44 For an account of bribery in Japan by American tobacco companies, see Mark Levin (2009). Lighting up the foreign corrupt
practices act: A case study ofU.S. tobacco industry political influence buying in Japan. N.C. J INTi. L. & CoMM. REG, 34(2), 471.
4 Pub. L. No. 104-67109 Stat. 737, 15 U.S.C. §78j-1.
46 Ibid.
47 Deming, supra note 3, 371-380.
48 Siemens disgorged $350 million in 2008; KBR $177 in 2009. The SEC takes it back, in FCPA Blog (March 3, 2009). David C.
Weiss (2009). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. SEC disgorgement of profits. and the evolving international bribery regime. MICH.
J. INTL L.. 30(2). 471. 487.
49 Carrie Johnson (December 5. 2007). U.S. targets bribery overseas. Washington Post, DI. And they may be increasingly prone to
enforce criminal laws prohibiting money laundering, wire and mail fraud. and conspiracy laws in the context of bribery allegations.
George J. Terwilliger (June 2, 2008). Corrupt payments abroad: FCPA and other risks. National Law Journal, 12. U.S. Dep't Justice.
Press Release 10-048, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees of Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in
Foreign Bribery Scheme (January 19, 2010), retrieved from http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-crm-048.html.; Ashby
Jones Another Individual Falls in DOJ's FCPA Ramp-Up, Wall Street J. m February 11, 2010. http:/blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/02/11/
another-indvidual-falls-in-DOJ's FCPA-Ramp-Up/.
50 Sheri Qualters (January 9, 2008). Risk of bribe probe grows for business. National Law Journal, 8.
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officials on behalf of an American firm.
Two of the recent cases advanced by the SEC and the DOJ warrant special notes. One is the case against the
52Halliburton Company that disgorged $550 million in 2008 as punishment for its corrupt practices in Nigeria.
Albert Jack Stanley, who managed the Halliburton subsidiary under the supervision of Richard Cheney, then the
Halliburton CEO and Vice President of the United States from 2001 to 2009, 5 reduced his own sentence to three
years in prison when he became a primary witness in federal prosecutions for his firm's bribery of public officers
in Nigeria. Halliburton, long centered in Houston, in 2008 moved its corporate headquarters to Dubai,
apparently in hope of reducing its exposure to federal law enforcement.5 5 Its continuing relationships in Iraq are
not presently the subject of criminal proceedings, but they are an appropriate subject of continuing
- - 56investigations.
Also to be noted is the prosecution of the German firm, Siemens, whose registration with the SEC exposed it
to federal prosecutions for bribes paid to the Nigerian government. That prosecution came on the heels of a
German prosecution.5 It resulted in a $1.6 billion fine paid by Siemens to the United States for corrupt practices
in numerous nations. That fine was in addition to one paid to Germany.
And the DOJ in January, 2009, for the first time initiated a proceeding to recover funds received as a bribe
paid by Siemens to the son of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh and held in a bank account in Singapore. This
appears to be its first effort to retrieve a bribe paid to a foreign official. 60 The event seems perhaps to have alerted
the Liberian government to the possible use of American aid in tracking its officials who have benefited from
corruption in that nation.
But still there are constraints on enforcement of such laws by public officials. Because of their adverse
domestic economic consequences, such federal prosecutions can be politically very difficult for the prosecutors in
the DOJ. For example, James Giffen, an American citizen, was arrested in 2003 and indicted in 2005 for bribing
President Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan on behalf of Mobil, Texaco, Phillips/Conoco and BP. His alleged
offense had gained public attention in 2000.62 After four years of investigation, Giffen was charged with thirteen
51 Marcia Coyle (June 11, 2007). Jefferson Case shows SEC, DOJ targeting individuals: Foreign Corrupt Act Case reflects a trend.
National Law Journal, 6. The case went to trial on June 8, 2009. Big Day for the FCPA. the FCPA Blog, June 9. 2009.
52 It paid $382 million to the Department of Justice and $177 million to the SEC. Anna Driver (January 26, 2009). Halliburton to pay $559
million to settle bribery probe. Reuters. Retrieved July 10, 2009, from http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/ idUSTRE50P5ZE20090126.
" Stanley was in 1998 designated by Richard Cheney. then the president of Halliburton to preside over its subsidiary Kellogg. Brown
& Root (KBR). The bribes to Nigerian officials had commenced in 1995 and continued until 2004. when Stanley was fired. Russell
Gold (September 4, 2008). US: Halliburton ex-official pleads guilty in bribe case, Wall Street Journal.
54 Laolu Akande (April 14, 2009). Haillburton's ex-chief ready to testify in Nigeria. The Guardian.
" Charlie Crain (March 13, 2007). Halliburton takes the money and runs away. Huffington Post. Retrieved July 10, 2009, from
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charlie-cray/halliburton-takes-the-mon b 43304.html. Halliburton bails out of Iraq, KBR and now
America. Halliburton Watch, News. Retrieved July 10, 2009, from http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/news/dubai.html.
56 Ibid. Jim Donahue (October 10, 2006). Iraq for sale: The war profiteers, Halliburton Watch. Retrieved July 10, 2009, from
http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/news/iraqforsale.html. Pratap Chaterjee (June 3, 2009). Is Halliburton forgiven and forgotten? Or how
to stay out ofsight while profiting fom the war in Iraq. Retrieved July 10. 2009. from http://www.corpwatch.org/ article.php?id=15372.
57 Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller (December 20, 2008). At Siemens, bribery was just a line item, N. Y. TIMES.
8 T. Christian Miller (December 22. 2008). Help us name names in Siemens corruption scandal, ProPublica,.
'9 Supra note 48.
60 Chasing dirty money. The FCPA Blog, January 12, 2009.
61 Liberia's graft-busting leader, The FCPA Blog, January 12, 2009.
62 For a full account, see Steve LeVine (2007). The oil and the glory: The pursuit of empire and fortune on the Caspian Sea. New
York: Random House. Robert Baer (2002). See no evil: The true story of a ground soldier in the CIA's war on terrorism. New York:
Crown Publishers.
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counts of violating the FCPA and thirty three counts of criminal money laundering.63 President Nazarbaev, who
has been a friend of American foreign policy in the Middle East, was critical of the prosecution, perhaps sensing
that he could even lose his office as a result of it; prospective government witnesses were said to have received
64death threats. In his defense, Giffen alleged that he had been regularly debriefed by United States government
officials, and claimed that "by the time of the transactions at the heart of the indictment, he understood himself to
be working not only for the government of Kazakhstan, but also for United States government agencies" . DOJ
moved to preclude the defendant from advancing the defense that he was acting on public authority, or to use
information classified as secret by the government agencies said to be involved. The trial court denied the motion
to preclude the defense, but did not rule on the motion regarding government secrets. On appeal by DOJ, the court
of appeals, after a year of deliberation, dismissed the appeal on the ground that the trial court order to be reviewed
lacked the finality essential to appellate jurisdiction. The trial has been repeatedly postponed. It will perhaps be
67held some day, but we are told that "diplomats usually win over the prosecutors and it would seem Kazakhstan
is too important to continue the Giffen case" 68
The Giffen case, although extraordinary, 69 illustrates the fundamental difficulty with public enforcement of
any law forbidding bribery of foreign officials. The responsible public officers so engaged are required to punish
their fellow citizens, with whom they may have diverse connections and shared interests, and to whom they owe
their official status, in order to protect a distant government with whom they have no connection.70 Co-nationality
is a weaker connection than guanxi, but reflects the unconcern for the circumstances of distant others to which
Adam Smith adverted.
One example of weak enforcement of laws enacted in other states pursuant to the OECD Convention is
provided by a case arising in Lesotho. Lesotho prosecutors, at the urging of the World Bank, sought in 2000 to
punish Canadian, French, and Italian nationals and their firms for corrupt practices related to the Lesotho
Highlands Water Project.7 1 As a result of the prosecutors' efforts, the World Bank barred one firm from further
63 Press Release (April 2, 2003). US attorney, Southern District of New York. Retrieved May 22, 2010, from www.justice.gov/
usao/nys/pressreleases/April03 /giffenwilliams.pdf.64 Marlena Telvick (May 20. 2004). United States v. James H. Giffen. International Freedom Network. Retrieved May 31, 2010. from
http://ifn.org.uk/article..php?sid=2. The indictment also alleged that Swiss authorities had begun investigating accounts "nominally
owned by offshore companies but beneficially owned, directly or indirectly, by Balgimbaev and Nazarbaev. into which Mr. Giffen
had made tens of millions of dollars in unlawful payments" in 1999.
65 Ibid.
66 United States v. Giffen, 473 F. 3d 30 (2d cir. 2006).
67 James Giffen and America's secrets, The FCPA Blog, July 16, 2009. Retrieved October 23, 2009, from http://fcpablogspot.com/
2009/07/james-giffen-and-americas-secrets.html. Meanwhile, another American, Mark Seidenfeld has been accused of corrupt
practices in Kazakhstan on behalf of a different client. His investigation was dropped in 2007, but then reopened. See Following
acquittal, new false charges are pending against Mark Seidenfeld, August 29, 2007. Retrieved July 13, 2009, from http:/savemark.
wordpress.com/2007/08/29/following-acquittal-new-false-charges-are-pending-against-mark-seidenfeld/.68 James Giffen and America's Secrets. ibid.
69 For example. in a similar case, Frederic Bourke was convicted in October 2009 of allowing his agent in Azerbaijan pay bribes to
officials. Bourke denied new trial. The FCPA Blog, October 14. 2009. Retrieved October 23, 2009. from http://fcpablog.com/2009/10
/borke-denied-new-trial.html.
70 On the shortcomings of traditional legal solutions in the context of environmental law, see Elisa Morgera (2009). Corporate
accountability in international environmental law. London: Oxford University Press, 25-62.
71 An account of the project is Horta Koninna (1995), The mountain kingdom's white oil: The Lesotho Highlands water project. The
Ecologist, November 01. Retrieved April 20, 2010, from www.accessmylibrary.com/article-IGI-18066468/mountain-kingdom-
white-oil.html.
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participation in projects funded by it.72 And convictions in Lesotho resulted in penalties imposed on some
subsidiary corporations, but the convicted foreigners apparently remain at large. OLAF, the anti-fraud office of the
European Union did supply some data on the parent corporate defendants, but other help to Lesotho was not
forthcoming. 73 Such events are obviously discouraging to prosecutors in developing nations who need to consider
competing needs for their scarce professional resources.
Another example of the difficulties arose in 2004 in the United Kingdom. Having recently enacted its
criminal law as required by the OECD Convention, its Serious Fraud Office initiated an inquiry into bribes
allegedly paid by BAE Systems, the British weapons firm, to secure contracts with the government of Saudi
Arabia. In November 2006, it was reported that Saudi Arabia, perhaps inspired by the Kazakhstan experience in
the United States, threatened to break diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom if the investigation were not
dropped. The next month, the investigation was dropped "after balancing the need to uphold the rule of law
with the wider public interest." Prime Minister Tony Blair justified the action by calling attention to the needs to
secure the help of Saudi Arabia in dealing with Palestinian affairs and to secure thousands of jobs of workers hired
to perform the corrupt contract, 7 considerations said to overbalance the rule of law. Mr. Blair's successors were
told by the High Court of Justice in 2008 to reconsider his decision to discontinue the investigation, but on
appeal the House of Lords affirmed the Prime Minister's action in calling off the prosecution.7 7 A "summit"
conference was held in London in 2009 to explore the options and train business leaders to confront the issues.
That conference was apparently a part of a trend presenting other such "summit" conferences.
In October 2009, the BAE case was reopened by the Serious Fraud Office and in February 2010 the Office
was able to secure an admission from BAE that it had concealed payments made to middlemen and it paid a fine
of roughly $50 million. But what made this possible was BAE's confession of guilt under the United States
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and payment of a $400 million fine to the United States. so The Serious Fraud
Office has yet to demonstrate the will to punish the corruption of foreign officials by important British firms
seeking to gain an advantage for the Office's fellow countrymen.
72 See Lesotho water project corruption. Retrieved April 20, 2010, from http://internationalrivers.org/en/node/938.
73 Fiona Darroch. Lesotho highlands water project: Corporate pressure. On the prosecution and judiciary, transparency
international. Global corruption report 2007: Corruption in judicial systems (Diana Rodriguez Ed..2007).
74 David Leppard (November 19, 2006). Blair hit by Saudi 'bribery' threat. The Times.
75 Kevin LaCroix (April 11, 2008). Corrupt practices, national security and the rule of law, The D&O Diary. Retrieved July 13, 2009,
from
http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/04/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/corrupt-practices-national-security-and-the-rule-of-law/.
On the public reaction to the discontinuarance, see Barefaced (December 23. 2006), The Economist, 18. Heather Timmins & Eric
Pfanner (December 12, 2006). Blair defends decision to halt inquiry into Saudi defense contracts. International Herald Tribune, 12.
For a later account, see Alan Corwell (June 6, 2007). British contractor paid Saudi, reports say. A Y. TIMI-s, A3. Todd Swanson
(2007). Greasing the wheels: British deficiencies in relation to American clarity in International Anti-Corruption Law. Georgia
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 35(2), 397.
6 The case against the action was brought by an NGO, The Campaign against Arms Trade. The organization was thanked by the
court for bringing the action. High Court Re-opens Saudi Arms Corruption Investigation, Ekklesia (April 24. 2008). Retrieved July
13, 2009, from http://ekklesia.co.uklnode/7051.
7 Christopher Hope (July 30, 2008). SFO was right to call off BAE-Saudi corruption probe, law Lords rule. London Telegraph.
Retrieved July 13, 2009 from http://www.telegraph.co.uklnews/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/2473629/SFO-was-right-to-call-
off-BAE-Saudi-corruption-probe-law-lords-rule.html.
78 See UK. Anti-Corruption Summit 2009. Retrieved July 13, 2009, from http://businessassurance.com/uk-anti-corruption-summit-
2009/.
7 E.g., The 2"d Annual Global Anti-Corruption Summit USA 2009. Retrieved July 13, 2009, from http://www.ethicalcorp.com/
globalethics/.
80 See Christopher Drew & Nicola Clark (February 6, 2010). BAE settles allegations of bribery, New York Times, Bl.
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Anti-corruption laws do have a better chance of being locally enforced when a new regime takes over the
corrupted government and might reveal the dealings of its predecessors. This happened in Nigeria in 2007 8 and
led to the investigation of Siemens by the German government enforcing its new foreign corrupt practices law
enacted pursuant to the international initiatives. It appeared that in 2006, Siemens' Nigerian subsidiary had
acquired a contract to build a power sector, paying about $18 million to Nigerian officials to close the deal. 82
When this deal was exposed in 2007, the firm not only lost a contract but its parent firm also became the object of
criminal investigations in Germany and the United States, where its stock is traded and it is subject to the
corresponding laws governing accounting in publicly traded firms. The German parent firm cooperated in the
investigation and won a measure of restraint on the part of the prosecutors. It appears that it had budgeted $40
to $50 million a year from 2002 to 2006 to pay bribes to Nigerian officials. 84
As noted, the parent Siemens firm has now paid fines of $1.6 billion to the governments of Germany and the
United States for its corrupt practices in many nations. Siemens has declared its intent never to do it again. But
will future officers of Siemens keep that promise in mind? If so, can it compete successfully with firms less
constrained by their governments? Is it reasonable to expect that Siemens' experience will suffice to deter other
firms from other nations with less vigorous and less well-endowed prosecutors? A blacklisting of Siemens has
been lifted and in 2008 it acquired new contracts with Nigeria to construct its power sector.
It is reported that France, like Germany, has become actively engaged in anti-corruption law enforcement. 86
That may be the reality throughout the European Union. Nevertheless, a skeptic may well doubt that the criminal
laws pose a very serious threat to most of those many firms around the world whose profits, indeed perhaps their
economic viability, seem to depend on their willingness, or at least the willingness of their subsidiaries and their
local officers, to participate in the weakening corruption of foreign officials to secure markets for their goods or
services. Of course, such criminal laws express a moral judgment, and businessmen are not immune to moral
suasion. But, as noted, the moral force of such international law is chronically weak. And corrupt practices are by
definition secret crimes that can be prevented or deterred only by vigorous investigation and forceful legal
sanctions that may not be forthcoming.
Transparency International, an organization devoted to the cause, reports that progress in deterring corrupt
practices has been at best modest. In response to this situation, the OECD Council in 2009 posted a new
recommendation that member states raise taxes on their firms detected to be engaged in international corrupt
practices. They are also directed to increase public awareness of the criminal law, improve auditing practices,
" President Umaru Yar'Adua assumed office in March 2007, promising to rid the nation of the squalor of corruption. A contract with
Siemens Nigeria for a supply of circuit breakers was cancelled in November. Nigeria suspends Siemens dealings, BBC NEWs
(December 8, 2007). Retrieved July 13, 2009 from http://news.bbc.co.uld2/hi/business/7130315.stm.
82 Ibid.
83 Siri Schubert & T.Christian Miller (December 21. 2008). Where bribery was just a line item. New York Times, Bl.
84 Ibid.
8' Nigeria: Halliburton, Like Siemens, Vanguard (April 21. 2009). Retrieved July 13, 2009. from http://allafrica.com/stories/
200904210245.html. A protest is voiced in an editorial originally written for Vanguard, Siemens- Unworthy Causes, May 5, 2009,
http://www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/news/Stock%/o20News/2310866/.
Morgan Lewis, Anti-corruption laws in Europe. Retrieved July 13. 2009, from http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/
LITWebcast Anti-CorruptionLawsInEurope 21janO9.pdf.
87 See supra note 22.
As by allowing a tax deduction for the cost of bribes paid, as was long the practice in the United States. 2009 Council
Recommendation on Tax Measures for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign. Public officials in international business,
recommendation iii. Retrieved May 22, 2010, from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 11/40/44176910.pdf.
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limit public subsidies and licenses to those firms more closely observed in their compliance, and who cooperate
fully with the OECD's peer review system of investigation and accountability.89
If China were now to ratify the OECD Convention and join the other "developed" nations concerned with the
integrity of the global marketplace, it would subject itself to an obligation not only to enact laws punishing
transnational corruption by Chinese firms employing Chinese workers, but it would be expected to join in the
additional conditions imposed by the 2009 OECD Recommendations.
4. Civil law deterring corruption
These OECD Recommendations also urged member states "to further examine" the possible use of "civil,
commercial, and administrative laws and regulations, to combat foreign bribery." 90 This follows the leadership of
the Council of Europe that in 1999 adopted the Civil Law Convention on Corruption. Its aim, as stated by the
Council of Europe was to take "into account the need to fight corruption and in particular provide for effective
remedies for those whose rights and interests are affected by corruption."91 Signatories are obliged to authorize
civil actions for compensation of firms damaged by corrupt practices.92 This Convention entered into force in
2003. It provides for actions for compensation to the defrauded government, such as that of Iraq in the oil-for-food
scandal,93 for all damages suffered as a result of corruption.94 It also provides for the protection of whistle
95 96 97blowers, the acquisition of evidence , and provisional remedies. In addition, it requires transparency in
company accounts 98 and strives to promote international co-operation and monitoring.
With this Convention, the Council of Europe acknowledged the need for a civil enforcement mechanism
imposing real adverse economic consequences on firms that bribe foreign governments. Civil liability for the
harm to the corrupted business partner is surely important to deter firms from bribing one another's corporate
officers in the private sector. The integrity of many other governments calls for a similar and plausible threat of
civil liability to the government suffering harm as a result of a corrupt action. But while the Civil Law Convention
is a significant step forward, reports of civil actions against offenders are few. The incentives constraining
criminal prosecutions of fellow citizens who bribe foreigners also arise when civil actions are being considered by
public officers.99
To date, no effort appears to have been made to bring the Council of Europe into line with the law of the
United States recognizing bribery of foreign officials by American firms as a tort 100 subject to punitive
See supra note 11.
90 Supra note 87. Recommendation viii.
9' Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption. Ch. I Art. 3, November 4, 1999. Retrieved July 13, 2009, from
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Htmi/1 74.htm.
92 Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption Explanatory Report Article 1(a)(6)(1999). Retrieved from
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/1 74.ht 3.
See Iraq's legacy lawsuit. The FCPA Blog. Retrieved May 7, 2009. from http://fcpablog.blogspot.com/ (hereinafter "The FCPA
Blog").
94 Supra note 91.Article 3.
9' Ibid. Article 9.
96 Ibid. Article 11.
97 Ibid. Article 12.
98 Ibid. Article 10.
99 See Andrea K. Bjorklund (2007). Private rights and public international law: Why competition among International Economic Law
Tribunals is not working. Hastings Law Journal, 59(2), 241.
100 See generally OlafMeyer (Ed.).(2009). Civil consequences ofcorruption.
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damages lo1 in proceedings brought by competitors who lost government contracts as a result of a defendant's
payment of a bribe, 102 or by victimized governments such as Iraq. 1os Thus, while the Civil Law Convention takes
steps in the direction of civil enforcement, those steps may be insufficient to deter European firms motivated by
the marketplace to engage in corrupt practices, except possibly for the most blatant misdeeds. 104 And of course,
that Convention is enforceable only against firms subject to the jurisdiction of states that are members of the
European Union.
The 2009 Resolution of the OECD Council urges consideration of other forms of civil enforcement of
foreign corrupt practices law. This evokes recollection of the false claims laws enacted in the United States in the
1 9 th century, and further enhanced in the 2 0 th and 21st century. The citizen who enforces that law does so by filing
a civil action in the name of the United States, much as some ancient English civil actions were brought in the
name of the King by his loyal subjects. The government is afforded an opportunity to take over the case, but the
citizen-plaintiff remains an interested party. If fraud is proven, the defendant is required to pay treble damages,
and the citizen-plaintiff is generously rewarded for his or her public service. 105
The proven effectiveness of that law is derived from numerous other features in addition to the prize offered
to the successful citizen plaintiff. American civil procedure law contributes to the effectiveness of the private
enforcement of many public laws. One important feature is the American Rule that liberates the citizen plaintiff
from liability for the costs of a successful defense against his claim. 106 Another is the contingent fee that enables
the plaintiff to retain counsel who will be compensated only if the claim succeeds. 10 A third is the law of
discovery that empowers the citizen plaintiff's lawyer to conduct an investigation of witnesses and documents not
unlike that conducted by a criminal prosecutor. 108 A fourth is the right of plaintiffs to aggregate their identical
claims in one class action. 09
These features of American civil procedure are, of course, available to foreign plaintiffs asserting claims in
American courts against defendants who are subject to their jurisdiction. It is possible to imagine many forms of
private civil enforcement in American courts of foreign or international laws as well as American laws prohibiting
foreign corrupt practices.
But if OECD or those pursuing the 2009 recommendations are very serious about securing effective civil law
enforcement of its Convention, perhaps it should begin to consider the possible roles of citizen plaintiffs and the
need for procedural accommodations needed to enable and encourage citizens to come forward to protect
governments from corrupt practices. Given the World Bank's interest in the cause, it is imaginable that it could
'0' 84 Stat. 922, 18 U.S.C. §901 et seq.
102 See, e.g. Kirkpatrick, WS & Co. v. Environmental Techtronics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).Compare Kensington Int'l Ltd. v.
Societe Nat. des Petroles du Congo, 2006 WL 846351 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
103 See Supra note 91.Article 3.
104 Perhaps the United Kingdom might be an exception. See Kary Klismet (2001).Quo Vadis. "Qui Tam": The future of private false
claims suits against states after Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens. Iowa Law Review. 87(1), 283,
287-288.
'0 For a full account, see Henry Scammell (2004). Giantkillers: The team and the law that help whistle-blowers recover America's
stolen billions. New York: Atlantic Monthly. 37-38.
106 See Thomas D. Rowe. Jr. (1982). The legal theory of attorney fee shifting: A critical overview. Duke L. J., September, 651.
107 See Sung-Ho J. Ahn (1998). Litigiousness, contract design and the economic motives of the contingent fee lawyer. Santa Monica,
CA: Rand Corp.
08 See. e.g. F. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
109 See F. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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establish an arbitral forum suitably equipped with rules of procedure and rewards that would suitably encourage
citizens in even the weakest and most impoverished states to become enlisted in the cause of deterring the
corruption of their governments. The World Bank has established the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes. While that Center in its present form is not suited to the task of enforcing corruption law,
such a transnational institution could be devised. 110 It might possibly gain a measure of trust from the humanity in
whose behalf the Bank governs and thus alert transnational firms to the risk of the adverse consequences of
corrupt practices to themselves.
5. Conclusion
It is crucial to even modest success for this international movement against transnational corruption that
China participate by enacting laws to deter bribery of foreign officials by Chinese firms. While a criminal law is
the obvious response required, a civil law would be more timely and effective. If, as appears to be the case, guanxi
weakens the force of moral principles such as those the international movement seeks to embed in international
business practices, the international movement would have even greater need for methods of private enforcement
of the international conventions that would serve to deter corrupt practices. But participation by China in the
international movement might also be a special benefit to it. If such a system of motivating effective private law
enforcement were established, it might serve the interests of China by reinforcing the current domestic movement
to distinguish the bribery of public officials from the benign connections formed pursuant to the social morality of
guanxi.
(Edited by Jane T.)
no See generally C. Binder et al (Eds.).(2009). International investment law in the 21st century. C. Rogers & R. Alford (Eds.).(2009).
The future of investment arbitration. For full consideration of this possibility, see Paul D. Carrington. Enforcing international corrupt
practices law, Mich. J Intl. L. (forthcoming 2011).
1 Robert A. Dahl (2006). On political equality. New Haven: Yale University, 87-92.
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